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I. Starting points
Traditionally, trade secret protection has been left to the national laws of the Mem-
ber States. In part, this was due to the very varied approaches. Only recently has 
there been a trend towards (minimal) harmonisation at the level of the European 
Union. There are also provisions in the international treaties that are relevant, 
but again these provisions have a rather narrow (harmonising) scope.
In practice trade secrets have been gaining importance though. They are no 
longer seen mainly as the addendum to patent law and they have gained much 
more value and importance in their own right. Stories of (electronic) industrial 
espionage have only re-enforced the (perceived) need to protect trade secrets 
adequately. All this has brought about renewed attention for the topic of harmo-
nisation of trade secrets law in the European Union. Previously, this was seen as 
difficult and in comparison not sufficiently important. The new draft directive 
now symbolises the renewed push towards harmonisation.
1. National laws - traditional approaches
Defining exactly what amounts to a trade secret is not an easy task and there is 
no widely accepted definition of a trade secret. It is also important to note right 
from the start that the vast majority of countries in the eu offer a remedy in this 
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area, rather than an (exclusive) right. Italy is the most notable exception, as the 
Italian intellectual property code specifically lists trade secrets as an intellectual 
property right.1 Sweden has ad hoc legislation on trade secrets and Portugal and 
France (the latter only for manufacturing trade secrets) have specific provisions on 
the protection of trade secrets in their respective codes of intellectual property.2 
Most other countries rely strongly on unfair competition law to offer a remedy 
for the abuse of trade secrets. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Poland and Spain are 
good examples.3 Yet other countries, such as the Netherlands and Luxemburg, 
rely on general principles of tort law to offer a remedy. On the common law side 
there is a strong reliance on breach of confidence, e.g. in the United Kingdom4 
and in Ireland, but also in Malta.5
All countries also rely strongly on contract law. Often there is also a (somewhat 
more limited) role for criminal law. Belgian law is a good example. Whereas trade 
secrets in general are protected by the law of unfair competition and the law of 
contract, there is special protection in criminal law for the more restrictive cate-
gory of trade secrets known as manufacturing trade secrets.6
2. National laws rather than a Directive or a Regulation
What has become clear from these introductory comparative comments is that 
not only is there no exclusive right, leaving Italy to one side for a moment, but 
only a remedy based on different legal principles, there is also no eu instrument 
dealing with trade secrets. At present there is no harmonisation Directive or a 
Community trade secret based on a Regulation. De lege lata the whole matter is 
left with the individual member states. As we will see though, that may change 
in the near future (de lege feranda).7
1. Articles 98 and 99 of the Italian Industrial Property Code.
2. Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in the Internal Mar-
ket, Final Study. April 2013, Prepared for the European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/130711_final-study_en.pdf
3. See Van Caeneghem, W., Trade secrets and intellectual property: Breach of confidence, 
misappropriation and unfair competition, Wolters Kluwer, 2014.
4. P. Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law, 7th ed., oup, 2013, 
Ch 29.
5. T. Aplin, L. Bently, Ph. Johnson & S. Malynicz, Gurry on breach of confidence: 
The protection of confidential information, oup, 2nd ed., 2012.
6. Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in the Internal Mar-
ket, Final Study. April 2013, Prepared for the European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/130711_final-study_en.pdf
7. See P. Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law, 7th ed., oup, 
2013, p. 623.
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3. The Paris Convention and the trips Agreement
There are however some international foundations on which this area of law and 
the various approaches in the Member States are built. Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention obliges the Member States to provide effective protection and unfair 
competition. The appropriation of trade secrets without permission is probably 
one of the clearest examples of acts of unfair competition and, as was seen above, 
Article 10bis and the reliance on principles of unfair competition is reflected in 
the national laws of many Member States. Section 7 of the trips Agreement then 
builds on this starting point and article 39 trips Agreement deals explicitly with 
the protection of undisclosed information. As all eu Member States are bound by 
the trips Agreement and in the absence of an eu instrument dealing with trade 
secrets, the following provision is the common core of the national approaches 
to trade secret protection:
section 7: protection of undisclosed information
Article 39
1. In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as provided 
in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed 
information in accordance with paragraph 2 and data submitted to governments or 
governmental agencies in accordance with paragraph 3.
2. Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information 
lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others 
without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices so long 
as such information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and 
assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons 
within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person 
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.
3. Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of phar-
maceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, 
the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which involves a 
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considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In addi-
tion, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where necessary to 
protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected 
against unfair commercial use.
Note: For the purpose of this provision, “a manner contrary to honest commercial 
practices” shall mean at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence 
and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed information 
by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such 
practices were involved in the acquisition.
A first important point in this article is the definition that is offered of the concept 
of undisclosed information. That definition falls apart into three requirements. 
First of all, protection is, or should be, available if the information is secret. That 
is in turn defined as information that is not generally known among or readily 
accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of infor-
mation in question. Availability of the information in the public domain seems to 
be the bottom line here. Secondly, on top of that the aspect of secrecy must give 
or add commercial value to the information. And thirdly, the person lawfully in 
control of the information must take reasonable steps to keep it secret.8
The importance of this definition is for example also shown by the fact that 
the Italian intellectual property code has copied it quasi verbatim when defining 
its trade secret right.
Whilst the focus is clearly on secrecy and the confidential nature of the infor-
mation, there is virtually no restriction, apart from the element of ‘commercial 
value’, on the kind of information that can be protected. In practice a diverse 
range of information is covered. Technical knowledge, often referred to in this 
context as know-how, is the obvious example, but all kinds of commercial data 
such as information on customers and suppliers, business plans, market strategies 
and market research are also included in the range of information that can be 
protected as a trade secret.9
A second important point is the indication that is given as to what kind of 
dealings with trade secrets will entitle their holder to a remedy. Or if one want 
to put it this way, what will amount to an act of unfair competition or when will 
a tort be committed in relation to a trade secret? On this point article 39 trips 
Agreement places the emphasis on the unauthorised disclosure by, acquisition to 
or use by others without the consent of the holder of the undisclosed information 
8. D. Gervais, The Trips Agreement: Drafting history and analysis, 4th ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2012, pp. 541-546.
9. See A. Coleman, The legal protection of trade secrets, Sweet & Maxwell, 1992.
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in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices. The concepts of disclosure, 
acquisition or use without the consent of the holder of the undisclosed informa-
tion are rather straightforward and do not require additional clarification. The 
qualification to these things happen in a manner contrary to honest commercial 
practices is interesting though and goes beyond a mere reference to unfair com-
petition. The note to article 39 explains that for the purpose of that provision, 
“a manner contrary to honest commercial practices” shall mean at least practices 
such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and 
includes the acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties who knew, 
or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved in 
the acquisition. Especially the reference to third parties who know or who were 
grossly negligent in failing to know brings in a subjective element. There is on the 
other hand a strong tendency to keep this element to an objective test. Obliging 
the claimant to prove a subjective element in the mind of the defendant makes 
effective trade secret protection more burdensome and harder to achieve. There 
may not be a right in the information that forms the trade secret, but applying 
merely an objective test makes obtaining protection easier and seems to be more 
aligned to the practice in relation to intellectual property rights.10 We will return 
to this debate later on in this chapter in the context of the proposed eu Direc-
tive. Suffice it to say here that the Commission proposal included a subjective 
element, clearly based in the wording of article 39 trips Agreement and the note 
to it, whilst the Council prefers an objective test.
II. The Draft Directive
1. A minimalist approach is proposed
Pushed to an extent by allegations of large scale espionage by the us, the European 
Commission proposed a ‘Directive on the protection of undisclosed know-how 
and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use 
and disclosure’ in November 2013.11 The Council has now issued its opinion (19 
May 2014)12 on the draft Directive, but the European Parliament is still debating 
the draft. There is therefore not yet a European instrument in this area, let alone 
one that has been implemented by the Member States, but the eu is clearly edging 
towards a degree or harmonisation when it comes to the protection of trade secrets.
10. D. Gervais, The Trips Agreement: Drafting history and analysis, 4th ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2012, pp. 541-546.
11. See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/131128_
proposal_en.pdf
12. See http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209870%202014%20
init
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One should emphasise right from the start that this is a very different en-
deavour than e.g. the Trade Mark Directive. The aim is not to put in place a 
comprehensive eu regime for the protection of trade secrets. There will only be 
a partial harmonisation of the national laws of the Member States, focussing 
on the unlawful acquisition, disclosure and use of trade secrets, and that har-
monisation will be of a minimalist nature in the sense that Member States may 
provide, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, for more far-reaching 
protection against the unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure of trade secrets than 
that required in the Directive. The Council thought it wise to add that expressis 
verbis to article 1 of the draft Directive. Whilst businesses will be able to rely on 
a minimal level of protection for the their trade secrets in every Member State, 
they will still have to contend with 28 (slightly) different national laws routed in 
different areas of law. The benefits of this harmonisation will therefore be much 
more limited that the benefits in other areas of intellectual property law, such as 
trade marks, design, and even copyright.
2. Definitions
The Directive does of course need a definition of a trade secret. In this respect 
the draft sticks closely to article 39 trips Agreement. This is the version of article 
2 of the draft Directive:
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) ‘trade secret’ means information which meets all of the following requirements:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and 
assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons 
within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret;
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person 
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret;
(2) ‘trade secret holder’ means any natural or legal person lawfully controlling a 
trade secret;
(3) ‘infringer’ means any natural or legal person who has unlawfully acquired, used 
or disclosed trade secrets;
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(4) ‘infringing goods’ means goods whose design, quality, functioning, manufacturing 
process or marketing significantly benefits from trade secrets unlawfully acquired, 
used or disclosed.
Whilst it is the generally accepted definition, it should not be forgotten that this 
definition is very wide in scope and covers an immense variety of technical and 
commercial information.
3. The scope of unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure
Article 3 then turns to the crux of the matter and defines the scope of violation 
of a trade secret. Redress is provided for the unlawful acquisition, use or disclo-
sure of a trade secret. The key concept here is that the relevant activity must be 
unlawful. In the Commission’s proposal proving unlawfulness involved passing a 
threshold of intention or (at least) gross negligence. This subjective element might 
raise the burden of proof and is out of line with the traditional approach towards 
primary infringement of intellectual property. The Council therefore proposed 
to replace it with a more objective approach that holds that any acquisition, use 
or disclosure which is, under the circumstances, considered contrary to honest 
commercial practices will be unlawful. This is also a return to the text of article 
39 trips Agreement, whereas the Commission had taken over the language of the 
final sentence of the note to that article. Knowledge as a factor is then restricted 
to forms of violation that can be characterised as indirect or secondary. In the 
Council’s version this results in the following provision:
2. The acquisition of a trade secret without the consent of the trade secret holder shall 
be considered unlawful, whenever carried out by [...] unauthorised access to, copying 
or appropriation of any documents, objects, materials, substances or electronic files, 
lawfully under the control of the trade secret holder, containing the trade secret or 
from which the trade secret can be deduced [or] any other conduct which, under the 
circumstances, is considered contrary to honest commercial practices.
3. The use or disclosure of a trade secret shall be considered unlawful whenever ca-
rried out, without the consent of the trade secret holder by a person who is found 
to meet any of the following conditions:
(a) have acquired the trade secret unlawfully;
(b) be in breach of a confidentiality agreement or any other duty to not disclose the 
trade secret;
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(c) be in breach of a contractual or any other duty to limit the use of the trade secret.
4. The acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret shall also be considered unlawful 
whenever a person, at the time of acquisition, use or disclosure, knew or should, 
under the circumstances, have known that the trade secret was obtained directly or 
indirectly from another person who was using or disclosing the trade secret unlawfully 
within the meaning of paragraph 3.
5. The production, offering or placing on the market of infringing goods, or import, 
export or storage of infringing goods for those purposes, shall also be considered an 
unlawful use of a trade secret when the person carrying out such activities knew, or 
should, under the circumstances, have known that the trade secret was used unlawfully 
within the meaning of paragraph 3.
This provision gives the protection of trade secrets an extremely wide scope.13 
And in certain circumstances such a wide scope of protection will not be appro-
priate and could trample on other rights. Article 4 tries to address that problem 
by putting in place a number of limitations. In a first step the article holds the 
acquisition of trade secrets to be lawful if it is achieved by independent disco-
very or creation; through observation, study, disassembly or test of a product 
or object that has been made available to the public or that it is lawfully in the 
possession of the acquirer of the information who is free from any legally valid 
duty to limit the acquisition of the trade secret; or any other practice which, 
under the circumstances, is in conformity with honest commercial practices. In 
all these circumstances there is no real obligation of secrecy and definitively no 
breach any such obligation. There is in other words no clash or conflict with the 
protection of the trade secret. In a second step the article has however to deal 
with those circumstances where there is a real clash with other rights or interests. 
One thinks here of the freedom of expression of investigative journalists, whist-
leblowers, workers representatives, etc. The Council has made this distinction 
very clear by adding a sentence that inserts the principle that any acquisition, 
use or disclosure of a trade secret will be lawful to the extent that it is required 
or allowed, not merely by eu law, but also by the national law of the member 
state concerned. The reference to national law should not simply be seen as a 
sign of weak harmonisation. National law still governs major issues in our socie-
ty where trade secrets could potentially interfere with other rights and interests, 
e.g. in relation to criminal justice, press regulation or certain elements of labour 
law and the representation of workers in companies. It is therefore important to 
13. Compare in the current uk system: P. Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual 
Property Law, 7th ed., oup, 2013, Ch. 29.
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state clearly that the Directive will not overrule those other legal provisions. The 
final paragraph of article 4 illustrates that principle by ruling out any remedy for 
any alleged acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret that was carried out:
(a) for making legitimate use of the right to freedom of expression and information;
(b) for the purpose of revealing a misconduct, wrongdoing or illegal activity, provided 
that the alleged acquisition, use or disclosure of the trade secret was necessary for 
such revelation and that the respondent acted in the public interest;
the trade secret was disclosed by workers to their representatives as part of the legi-
timate exercise of their representative functions, provided that such disclosure was 
necessary for that exercise; […]
(e) for the purpose of protecting a legitimate interest recognised by Union or na-
tional law.
One should not underestimate the importance of article 4. There was a clear need 
to protect other rights and interest, not all of which are in areas of (exclusive) eu 
competence. The version of the article suggested by the Council goes a long way 
in getting the balance between the interest of the holder of the trade secret on 
the one hand and the various other rights and interests that count in our society 
right. The remainder of the effort lies with the Member States and the courts 
when they will implement and apply the Directive.14
4. Redress
The draft Directive provides various form of redress, but the Commission’s draft 
and, even more explicitly through the insertion of the word ‘civil’ in article 5, 
the Council’s draft make it very clear that the draft Directive is only concerned 
with civil redress. Criminal law is not affected, which, in combination with the 
minimalist approach of the draft Directive, also means that those national laws 
that do have criminal sanctions, e.g. for the violation of manufacturing trade se-
crets, will be allowed to retain these or to introduce additional criminal sanctions. 
The measures, procedures and remedies that the Member States put in place by 
way of civil redress need to meet the general standards of fairness, equitableness, 
effectiveness and dissuasiveness and need not be unnecessarily complicated or 
14. See T. Aplin, “A critical evaluation of the proposed eu Trade Secrets Directive”, 
King’s College London Law School Research Paper n.º 2014-25, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2467946
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costly, nor entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. This approach 
has been copied from the trips Agreement and the Enforcement Directive. Si-
milarly, any application of such measures, procedures and remedies needs to be 
proportionate and provide safeguards against their abuse. There will also be a 
limitation period for claims based on the Directive’s provisions, but whereas the 
Commission wants to work with a very short period of one to two years after 
the holder of the trade secret becomes aware of the breach, the Council prefers 
to leave this to the Member States and to impose merely a maximum limitation 
period of six years. Both approaches reflect the perceived need to deal quickly with 
these matters and to remove any uncertainty in the interest of all parties involved.
Legal proceedings concerning a trade secret and its allegedly illegal acquisition, 
use or disclosure are of course in themselves a risk for the disclosure of a trade 
secret. It is therefore important that those involved in the proceedings can be gi-
ven an obligation not to disclose the trade secret. That is what the Commission’s 
draft did in its article 8. The Council’s draft takes a more cautious approach and 
requires a reasoned application by the interested party to install a secrecy regime 
in relation to information that the competent authorities have identified as con-
fidential. However one deals with it, confidentiality of trade secrets in the course 
of proceedings is in certain cases necessary and a vital ingredient of any regime 
dealing with trade secrets.
Just as with many other intellectual property, time is often of the essence. 
Secrecy is something that cannot be restored once it has been broken, making 
fast measures to prevent the acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret vital. 
Once a violation has occurred it is vital to stem the breach and to avoid that the 
consequences of the violation of the trade secret causes irreparable or large scale 
damage. The draft Directive addresses these concerns in its article 9 by putting 
in place a system of interim and precautionary measures. The holder of a trade 
secret can apply to the court for an interim injunction that prohibits or orders 
the cessation of the use or the disclosure of the trade secret on an interim basis. 
The holder can also apply for interim measures that deal with allegedly infringing 
goods. These measure can take the format of an order prohibiting the production, 
offering or placing on the market of the allegedly infringing goods, their impor-
tation, exportation or storage for these purposes. Allegedly infringing goods can 
also be seized or their delivery up can be ordered to prevent their entry into the 
market or their circulation within the market.15
Once a decision on the merits has been reached and the acquisition, use or 
disclosure of the trade secret has been held to be unlawful the Draft Directive 
provides a range of possible measures in its article 11. At the top of the list of 
15. Compare P. Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law, 7th ed., 
oup, 2013, Ch. 32.
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measures one finds injunctions, essentially to order the cessation or prohibition 
of the use of the disclosure of the trade secret. A prohibition to produce, offer, 
place on the market or use infringing goods that have benefitted from the tra-
de secret in any way, or import, export or store such infringing goods for those 
purposes may also be granted by the court by way of injunctive relief. On top of 
that the draft Directive proposes corrective measures with regard to the infrin-
ging goods. These infringing goods can be recalled from the market16 or there 
infringing quality can be removed. The court can also order the destruction of 
the infringing goods or the destruction of all or part of any document, object, 
material, substance or electronic file containing or implementing the trade se-
cret or, where appropriate, the delivery up to the applicant of all or part of those 
documents, objects, materials, substances and electronic files.
In addition damages can be awarded, either damages that are commensurate 
to the actual prejudice suffered or damages as a lump sum (e.g. on the basis of 
an estimate of royalties that could have become payable for the lawful use of the 
trade secret). The courts can also order the publication of the judgment.17
Conclusion
Trade secrets play an important role in our modern economy and business en-
vironment. In the form of know-how they do not only form an alternative to 
patent protection for an invention, but even if a patent is granted there is com-
plimentary know-how, e.g. concerning the best way to exploit the patent, that 
is not included in the patent application. That know-how is then kept and pro-
tected as a trade secret. But also outside the area of technical information there 
are all kinds of elements of commercial information, e.g. about the market and 
(potential) clients that are not available to the public domain at large, but that 
have great value, in part due to their confidential nature.
In the absence of an intellectual property right that protects the trade secret, 
national laws have longstanding tradition of protecting the trade secrets by offe-
ring a remedy against its unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure. These national 
regimes are rooted firmly in existing legal rules in the areas of unfair competition, 
tort or breach of confidence. But there is diversity, rather than uniformity. The 
only uniform provisions de lege lata are found in the basic provisions of the Paris 
Convention and the trips Agreement.
16. The holder of the trade secret can also request that the infringing goods are deli-
vered up to it or to charitable organisations.
17. See T. Aplin, “A critical evaluation of the proposed eu Trade Secrets Directive”, 
King’s College London Law School Research Paper n.º 2014-25, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2467946
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The eu draft Directive that is currently under consideration proposes to 
change that by imposing on Member States a minimal form of harmonisation 
and uniformity. It would not impose a (Community) right in relation to a trade 
secret, but it works with a common basic definition of a trade secret, the principle 
that there needs to be redress for the unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure of 
a trade secret and an catalogue of measures and remedies. Its aims are therefore 
limited, but its adoption would mean some progress in this area.
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